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RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING-POWER TO PLEDGE ASSETS TO SECuRE GENERAL
DEPOSITs-An Arizona statute provided that a certain kind of security be placed
by depositaries with the state treasurer before the latter might deposit public
funds therein. The treasurer demanded from a particular bank security in ad-
dition to that required by the statute, and the bank complied by pledging its
assets. The bank failed and its assignees in bankruptcy sought to have this
pledge declared invalid. Held, that the bank was bound by its pledge. Williams
v. Earhart, 273 Pac. 728 (Ariz. 1929).
In the absence of a statutory requirement to secure a deposit there has been
a decided conflict as to whether a depositary might pledge its assets for this
purpose. It is generally conceded that a bank has the corporate power to bor-
row money and to pledge its assets as collateral for the loan,2 and some courts
perceive no distinction in this respect between a loan and a deposit-holding
that the latter may with perfect propriety be secured by the bank's assets
The same result is sometimes reached by regarding the right to secure deposits
as a mere incident of the right to receive them.7 Other courts, however, have
definitely rejected the loan analogy, and in well reasoned opinions have decided
that the power to pledge assets to secure a deposit cannot be sustained as an
incidental power-that it is not a power necessary to carry on the business
of banking.! Courts adopting this view conclude that when a statute requires
public funds to be secured by the depositary in a defined manner there is thereby
implied a prohibition against any other form of security, and that the pledge
of the bank's assets is therefore invalid.5 Courts favoring the former view,
however, reach a conclusion in accord with that indicated by the principal
case-that the statutory requirement merely defines the kind of security the
public official is obliged to exact, and that he may demand and the bank may
give any additional security whether it be a pledge of assets or whether it
take some other form.6 The opponents of "secret pledging" of assets present
two sfrong arguments against this view. First, that it gives extra protection
to the secured depositors at the expense of those unsecured,' and second, that
it invites the public to deposit money upon a misrepresentation of the bank's
1 Auten v. U. S. Nat'l Bk. of N. Y., 174 U. S. 125, 19 Sup. Ct. 628 (1899);
Citizens Bk. v. Bk. of Waddy, 126 Ky. 169, IO3 S. W. 249 (i9o7).
'Williams v. Hall, 3o Ariz. 581, 249 Pac. 755 (1926); Page Trust Co. v.
Rose, 192 N. C. 673, 135 S. E. 95 (1926).
'McFerson v. Nat'l Surety Co., 72 Colo. 482, 212 Pac. 489 (1923); Ward
v. Johnson, 9.5 Ill. 215 (I880) ; MORSE, BANKING (6th ed. I928) §63.
" Commercial Bk. v. Citizens Trust Co., 153 Ky. 566, I56 S. W. i6o (I913).
See also Divide County v. Baird, 55 N. D. 45, 54, 212 N. W. 236, 24o (1927).
"Divide County v. Baird, supra note 4; Note (1928) 22 ILL. L. REv. 449.
'Richards v. Osceola Bk., 79 Iowa 707, 45 N. W. 294 (i89o).




financial condition.' The answer that has been offered to the first argument is
that a solvent corporation has the same right as an individual to prefer one
creditor over another or to secure one while leaving others unsecured? While
the second objection-that based on public policy-has been said to be un-
founded,'* and has been evaded,' it has not been satisfactorily answered, and
although the view indicated in the principal case is that held by a majority of tlie
courts, nevertheless there seems to be much force in the contention that it
tends to safeguard the public patron of a bank at the expense of the private
citizen who deposits his savings therein.
COMMERCE-REcONSIGNED LOCAL SHIPMENTS SUBJECT TO THROUGH RATE-
A rate of 34 cents per hundredweight, which had been approved by the Inter-
state Comnmerce Commission, existed between Paragould, Ark., and Marshall,
Texas. At the same time the local rate in Arkansas from Paragould to Tex-
arkana was 20.5 cents, and the local rate in Texas from Texarkana to Marshall
was 8 cents. The defendant for the purpose of taking advantage of the com-
bined local rates, which he paid, consigned goods to a consignee at Texarkana
who reconsigned them to him at Marshall where the goods arrived in their
original packages and under the same seals as when put on the cars at Para-
gould. held, that the carrier could recover the balance due under the interstate
rate. Marshall Mfg. Co. v. Texas and P. Ry. Co., 29 F, (2d) 66o (C. C. A.
Sth, 1928).
In a case arising before the passage of the Transportatiot. Act of ;r92o'
similar shipments had been held to be made interstate and the shipper was
not permitted to take advantage of the intermediate local rates which in
the aggregate were less than the interstate rate? It was argued that the
amendment' to the Interstate Commerce Act' took the principal case out of
that rule because the interstate rate being greater than the sum of the two
local rates was unlawful under the provisions of the statute. But the Inter-
' Divide County v. Baird, stpra note 4 at 56, 212 N. W. at 24i.
'Richards v. Osceola Bk., supra note 6 at 712, 45 N. W. at 296; Cameron
v. Christy, 286 Pa. 405, 411, 133 At. 551, 553 (x926).
Cameron v. Christy, su-pra note 9 at 410, 133 Ati. at 553.
, Page Trust Co. v. Rose, snpra note 2 at 676, 135 S. E. at 797 where the
court said: "Whether a sound public policy forbids such transfer . . . must
be determined by the general assembly, and not by this court."
'41 STAT. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. I (1926),
'Baltimore, etc. Ry. Co. v. Settle, 26o U. S. 166, 43 Sup. Ct. 28 (1922?),
holding that ccnsigning and reconsigning does not make the shipments intra-
state when there is the intention from the begining to make a through inter-
state shipment.
a41 'rSTAT. 480 (1920), 49 U. S. C. 4 (I) (1926) '"It shall be unlawful for
any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act . . . to charge
any greater compensation as a through rate than the aggregate of the inter-
mediate rates subject to the provisions of this Act."
'24 STAT. 38o (x887) prohibiting charging more for a short haul than for
a long haul over the same line.
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state Commerce Act imposes a duty on the carriers subject to its provisions
to publish rates' and prohibits a carrier from charging or receiving any greater
or less or different rate. This provision has been strictly applied, the policy of
the courts being that the rate must stand as published in order to carry out
the Congressional purpose to prevent unjust discrimination.7 When once a
rate is filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and published it be-
comes the legal rate and is conclusive as between the carrier and the shipper
until the Commission makes a change! The carrier is prohibited from de-
parting therefrom, and if the shipper refuses to pay the rate as published the
carrier may sue for its recovery9 The dourt therefore held the rate published
for the interstate shipment was the only legal rate and applied even though it
violated the provision against charging more for a through rate than the aggre-
gate of the intermediate tariffs. The same has been held where the published
rate violated the long and short haul clause of the Act." This decision is an-
other illustration of how the courts apply the published rates approved by the
Interstate Commerce Commission as conclusively controlling in cases arising
between the carrier and the shippern
CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw--IN~uNc 1oN UNDER SHERMAN AcT-SLING AND
INSTALLING PIPE-ORGANS Is NoT INTERSTATE CommERcE-Plaintiff, a foreign
corporation, contracted to sell and install certain pipe-organs. Plaintiff main-
tained an open shop both as to manufacturing and installing, and had its own
men do all of the work required by its contracts. Defendants, certain labor or-
ganizations, conspired to maintain a boycott against plaintiff's products and
installation. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction on the ground that de-
fendants were engaged in a conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce, by
reason of the Sherman Act,' as amended by the Clayton Act.' Held, (one judge
dissenting) that the installation is niot a part of interstate commerce. Aeolin Co.
v. Fischer, 29 Fed. (2d) 679 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
The sole question presented was whether the defendants were restraining
i34 STAT. 586 (1906), 49 U. S. C. 6 (I) (1926).
834 STAT. 587 (906), 49 U. S. C. 6 (7)(1926).
'Keogh v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163,43 Sup. Ct. 47,49 (1922).
'Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 35 Sup. Ct. 494 (1915) ;
Keogh v. C. & N. W. Ry., spra note 7; Pillsbury Flour Mills Co. v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., 2.q F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
'Penna. Ry. Co. v. International Coal Co., 23o U. S. 184, 33 Sup. Ct 893
(1912); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Emmons Coal & Mining Co., 287 Fed. 168
(D. C. Pa., 1923).
'Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry Co. v. Magnolia Provisions Co., 26 F. (2d)
72 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928).
" See in general Robinson, The Filed Rate it Pu blic Utility Law (1928) 77
U. or PA. L. REv. 213.
126 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § I (1928).
238 STAT. 730 (1914) 15 U. S. C. §26 (1928).
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interstate business, for only in that event would the right to an injunction arise
Two opposing lines of decisions confronted the court. On the one side were
the holdings of the Supreme Court to the effect that selling and installing
lightning-rods,' selling and installing railroad switch-signals, and redelivering
fabricated steel from its agent to the vendee, in the state seeking to regulate,
after previous delivery from outside to the agent,' are examples of local, intra-
state business. On the other side were Supreme Court holdings that selling
and delivering a picture and frame, to be assembled in the state of delivery,'
selling and installing an ice-machine, and selling and installing printing
presses 9 are wholly interstate transactions. Just where the line exists has never
been clearly determined, and each case must depend on all its relevant factors.
The court in the principal case, adopting a dissenting opinion in a recent federal
case," suggested that the distinction was "between shipping into a state raw ma-
terials, there to be manufactured into a deliverable form, and assembling within
a state an article requiring skill to set up, of which a sale had been made in
interstate commerce." In the Ice-Machine case the suggested point of dif-
ferentiation was ". . whether the service to be done in a state as the result
of an interstate commerce sale was essentially connected with the subject-
matter of the sale; that is, might be made to appropropriately inhere in the duty
of performance."' Also in that case the court distinguished the Signal-Switch
decision on the ground that further duties involved there were "inherently"
intrastate. In final effect, then, the test would seem to be: how intimately
connected with the sale itself is the act sought to be characterized as local?
While some of the record in the principal case tends to show that some of
the plaintiff's business of installing would be "construction" (and so intrastate),
most of it points to a mere process of assembly, and it is therefore felt that on
a full record" the Supreme Court would class this case in the interstate
group."
'Moore v. N. Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U. S. 593, 46 Sup. Ct. 367 (1926);
Geddes v. Copper Co., 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct. 209 (1921).
'Browning v. Waycross, 233 U. S. 16, 34 Sup. Ct 36o (1914).
'General Ry. Signal Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 500, 38 Sup. Ct 360 (1918).
No reasons for this decision were given, except to announce that it was within
the principle of the Lightning-Rod case, supra note 4.
'Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U. S. 124, 30 Sup. Ct. 649 (91o).
7 Kansas City Steel Co. v. Arkansas, 269 U. S. 148, 46 Sup. Ct. 59 (1926).
"York Co. v. Colley, 247 U. S. 21, 38 Sup. Ct. 430 (1918).
'Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921).
10 Cone v. Machine Co., 20 Fed. (2d) 593, 597 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927).
"Principal case, at 68o. Thus they distinguish between actual construction
and the mere assembly of the already constructed parts.
' Supra note 8, at 24. The language of the court here flatly disapproves the
Lightning-Rod case, supra note 4, but indicates that this decision expressly
excepted the situation which now was up for consideration.
' The force of the majority's holding is somewhat weakened by the em-
phasis placed by the court on the paucity of facts in the record and affidavits, on
the plaintiff's burden to show that it was within the statute, and the reluctance
to reverse the lower court's discretionary decree.
" For a collection of state decisions on the point involved herein, see: note
(1918) ii A. L. R. 614, 616.
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CONTRACTs-APPROVAL OF PROMISEE AS A CONDITION-The lessee covenanted
to insure "in the Law Fire Office or in some other responsible insurance office
to be approved by the lessor . . ." A policy in the Atlas Company, of ad-
mitted financial responsibility, was tendered. The lessor refused to approve and
brings an action for breach of covenant. Held, (one judge dissenting) that
the lessor had a right to disapprove. Tredgar v. Harwood, [1929] A. C. 72.
A contract to perform to another's satisfaction is valid and enforceable.'
Under such a clause, the mere expression of satisfaction by the promisee is not
the criterion by which the promisor's performance is to be judged.2 If such
were the case, the promise would be flagrantly illusory.3 The promisee's judg-
ment must be exercised fairly and honestly,' and not as a mere afterthought or
fictitious defense. His verbal expression is by no means conclusive, at least
in so far as the jury finds that it does not reveal a state of true dissatisfaction
existing in his mind.5 In New York' and a minority of' other states" the
courts are inclined to go one step further. The word "reasonable" is con-
strued into the contract, more or less in defiance of the intention of the parties.
This has the effect of shifting the seat of judgment from the promisee to the
jury, who are the ultimate judges of what is reasonable. Such a construction
seems artificial and unfair to the promisee. At best, it should be strictly limited
to cases where the subject matter of the contract is devoid of the element of
personal taste8 The principal case seems correct in applying the "honest" dis-
satisfaction test to a contract of insurance, and, while opposed in theory to the
New York decisions, has the important virtue of being a truthful interpre-
tation of the intention of the parties, as clearly expressed in the contract.
CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY OF INNOCENT PURCHASERS OF PARTIALLY PAID-UP
STOCK TO CORPORATE CREDITORs-In an action by creditors of a corporation
against stockholders for unpaid balances of the price of the stock, held, that those
stockholders who purchased their stock in the open market for value and without
knowledge that the corporation had not been paid the par value are not liable.
Gray Const. Co. v. Hyde, 222 N. W. 675 (S. D. 1928).
1 I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) 74; CORBIN, Conditions in the Law of
Contracts (I919) 28 YALE L. J. 738, 763.2 Williams v. Hirshorn, 91 N. J. Law 419, io3 Atl. 23 (.i918); Jessup &
Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co. 283 Pa. 434, 129 Atl. 559 (925).
' CORBIN, op. cit. supra note I, at 762. But see Duplex Safety Boiler Co.
v. Garden, ioi N. Y. 387, 4 N. E. 749 (1886).
'Mitchell v. Minnig, 68 Pa. Super. 306 (1917).
'Singerly v. Thayer, io8 Pa. 291 (1885); Inman Manufacturing Co. v.
American Cereal Co. 124 Iowa 737, 1oo N. W. 86o (1904).
'Greenburg v. Lumb, i29 N. Y. Supp. 182 (1911).
'Thomas Haverty Co. v. Jones, 185 Cal. 285, 197 Pac. 105 (192). But
see Hall v. Webb, 66 Cal. App. 416, 226 Pac. 403 (1924).
" Pennington v. Howland, 21 R. I. 65, 41 Atl. 89r (i89i) (portrait) ; Hana-
ford v. Stevens & Co., 39 R. I. 182, 98 Aft. 209 (i916). See Van Demark v.
California Home Extension Association, 43 Cal. App. 685, 185 Pac. 866 (i919).
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Corporate shareholders are not co-owners of the assets of the corporation.
The title to the property owned by the corporation rests in the corporate entity.'
The shareholders are generally said to hold choses in action against the cor-
poration.' Practically all stock certificates contain a clause that the stock is
transferrable only on the books of the corporation. It has been held, therefore,
that a sale of the stock, before the transfer on the books of the corporation,
amounts only to an equitable assignment and that the innocent assignee is
liable for any unpaid balances; this seems to have been the older view.' Other
courts, seeing an apparent analogy between stock certificates and negotiable
paper, or, more accurately, an analogy between innocent purchasers of stock
certificates and holders in due course, have held that an innocent purchaser is
not liable for unpaid balances4 Stock certificates are not negotiable paper.'
It has been held that the corporation is estopped from denying the recital on
the face of the certificate that the one to whom the stock was issued is the
owner thereof, and that, since the rights of creditors are obtained by subroga-
tion to the rights of the corporation,' the creditor cannot recover from the
innocent purchaser.7 But by providing that the stock is to be transferred only
on the books of the corporation, the corporation seems to have limited the
right of a-purchaser to rely on this statement. Nor is this slight boon to
speculation required by the modem commercial world in a case in which an
investigation on the books of the corporation would disclose the true facts.8
The principal case, therefore, is believed to be following an unnecessary and
illogical trend.
'Williamson .v. Smoot, 7 Mart 31 (La. i82o) ; Mickles v. Rochester Bank,
iI Paige I8 (N. Y. I844); see Spurlock v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 90 Mo. 20o, 207,
2 S. W. 21g, 221 (1886).
"Denton v. Livingston, 9 Johns 96 (N. Y. 1812); Slaymaker v. Bank of
Gettysburg, Io Pa. 373 (1849).
'Hammond v. Hastings, 134 U. S. 4oi, IO Sup. Ct. 727 (1884) ; Mechanics
Bank v. N. Y. Ry., 13 N. Y. 599 (1856); Young v. So. Tredegar Iron Co., 85
Tenn. 189, 2 S. W. 202 (1886).
'Feehan v. Kendrick, 32 Idaho 220, 179 Pac. 507 (i918) ; Coleman v. Howe,
154 Ill. 458, 39 N. E. 725 (i895) ; Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 316, 67 S. W. 644.
See i Coon, CoRPoRATIoNs (8th ed. 1923) § 5o.
'Stock certificates contain no words of negotiability; they are not promises
payable in money; the corporation has placed a definite restriction on the trans-
ferability of the certificate by providing that the legal title is to pass only upon
a transfer upon the books of the corporation. See Mechanics Bank v. N. Y.
Ry., supra note 3 at 623, 627.
'Williams v. Taylor, 99 Md. 3o6, 57 Atl. 641 (19o4); Leighton v. Leighton
Lea Ass'n, 74 Misc. 229, 131 N. Y. Supp. 561 (I1gi); Hawkins v. Donnerberg,
40 Ore. 97, 66 Pac. 691 (igor).
"Foreman v. Bigelow, 4 Cliff. 5o8 (U. S. 1878); Johnson v. Lullman, 15
Mo. App. (1884); Brown v. Wright, 48 Utah 633, i6I Pac. 448 (I916).
"But see Lanier v. Bank, ii Wall. 369, 377 (U. S. 187o); In re British
Farmers Co., 7 Ch. D. 533, 537 (1878) aff'd 3 App. Cas. 1004 (1878) sub norn.
Burkinshaw v. Nicolls (watered stock).
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CRIMINAL- LAw-CONSPIRACY-CONVICTION OF PARTIEs-The defendant
and his father were jointly indicted for conspiring together and with diverse
other persons to cheat and defraud the prosecutors. The father did not appear.
The defendant was convicted and sentenced but appealed on the ground that
his father might be acquitted. The father then died. Held,, that the judgment
was valid despite the death of the father. Commonwealth v. Bonnem, io Super.
Adv. 225 (Pa. 1928).
A criminal conspiracy has been defined as "a combination of two or more
persons, by some concerted action, to accomplish some criminal or unlawful
purpose, or to accomplish some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful
by crimirial or unlawful means."' The essence of the crime is the combination
or agreement between the parties, and the offense is complete even though no
overt act has been committed in pursuance of the confederacy.2 So by the very
nature of the crime it follows that it cannot be committed by less than tvo
persons On an indictment of several persons for conspiracy, however, it is
sufficient for conviction if the conspiracy is proved between any two of them,
though the remaining defendants all be acquitted But one defendant jointly
indicted with others cannot be convicted if all the others have been acquitted
Nevertheless, if tl1 the co-conspirators jointly indicted with the defendant
have died, the defendant may be convictedY Generally a conspirator indicted
jointly with others may be tried separately, in the discretion of the court, as
when his co-conspirators have not been arrested, and he may then be convicted
even before the trial of those not yet taken.' A defendant may be convicted on
an indictment charging a conspiracy with named persons and with persons un-
known to the grand jury, even though the persons named have been acquitted
IShaw, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. III, 123 (Mass. 1842).
Accord: People v. Blumenberg, 271 Ill. i8o, 183, 11o N. E. 788, 789 (915) ;
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 42 Pa. Super. 337-, 341 (i9IO), aff'd, 229 Pa.
6o9, 79 At. 222 (1911). But see State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 48, 70, 8 Atl. 89o,
892 (887).
2 State v. Setter, 57 Conn. 461, I8 Atl. 78 (1889) ; Commonwealth v. Stovas,
45 Pa. Super. 43 (i9io).
'State v. Jackson, 7 S. C. 283 (r876) ; CLARI & MARSHALL, THE LAW OF
CRIMES (2d ed. r9i2) 136.
'Breese v. U. S., 2o3 Fed. 824 (C. C. A. 4th, 1913) ; People v. Miles, 123
App. Div. 862, io8 N. Y. Supp. 5io (I9O8), aff'd, I92 N. Y. 541, 84 N. E. 1117
(1908).
State v. Buchanan, 5 Harr. & J. 500 (Md. 1823); Commonwealth v.
Brown, 23 Pa. Super. 470 (19o3) ; Regina v. Manning, 12 Q. B. D. 241 (1883) ;
cf. Rex v. Thorpe, 5 Mod. 221, 223 (Eng. I695). But when one of two defend-
ants has been granted immunity as a state witness, the other may be convicted.
Rex v. Duguid, 21 Cox C. C. 200 (Eng. 19o6); see Weber v. Commonwealth,
72 S. W. 30, 32 (Ky. 1903).
People v. Nall, 242 Ill. 284, 89 N. E. 1012 (xgo9); Regina v. Kendrick,
5 Q. ]3. 49 (843).
"People v. Richards, 67 Cal. 412, 7 Pac. 828 (x885); Commonwealth v.
MacKenzie, 211 Mass. 578, 98 N. E. 598 (1912). But when a mere severance
has been granted to those jointly indicted, judgment against any one conspirator
should be deferred until a verdict of guilty has been rendered against another
of them. Casper v. State, 47 Wis. 535 (1879).
8 Jones v. U. S., 179 Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 9th, 19io)'; Commonwealth v.
Edwards, I35 Pa. 474, 19 Atl. 1o64 (i8go).
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The crime of conspiracy being a joint offense, the courts would never grant a
new trial to one defendant found guilty without granting the same right to all
the other parties found guilty9 Today, however, this rule is only applied when
two defendants alone are indicted for the crime. 0 A consideration of the above
rules shows that one defendant may be convicted of conspiracy, providing the
failure to convict his co-conspirators does not remove the basis for the charge
against the former. Thus the decision in the instant case is unimpeachable,
inasmuch as the death of the father does not disprove the existence of a con-
spiracy with the defendant.
CRIMINAL LAw-CoNTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE RELEGATING INSANItY
PLEA TO SPEcIAL TRIAI--A California statute' provided that in criminal trials
a defendant who wished to plead insanity must do so specially, along with a
plea of not guilty. It further provided that the jury should first try the issue
of not guilty, conclusively presuming the defendant to be sane in so doing, and
then, if the defendant were found guilty under such plea, to thereafter try him
on the issue of insanity. The defendant, convicted of murder, contended that
the statute violated the due process clause of the federal Constitution. Held,
that the statute is constitutional. People v. Troche, 273 Pac. 767 Cal. (i928).
It is generally held that a state legislature, by virtue of its police power,
has the right to prescribe the methods of procedure to be followed in its courts,
and that such regulaticns will not be considered as violating the due process
clause provided that no substantial rights of its citizens are prejudiced thereby3
Thus statutes have been held valid which regulate continuances in criminal
trials,3 or which provide that a defendant will be proceeded against by informa-
tion instead of indictment,' or which specify that the testimony of an infant of
tender years need not be under oath But, on the contrary, a state legislature
can not arbitrarily make the proof of one fact conclusive proof of another,'
nor can it provide that the commission of an unlawful act may be proved by
mere reputation of the wrongdoer alone.7 Thus, in the last analysis, the validity
of the procedural changes depends on the reasonableness of the regulation. In
'Commonwealth v. McGowan, 2 Pars. 341 (Pa. 1848); Regina v. Gom-
pertz, 2 Cox C. C. 145 (Eng. 1846).
" Brown v. U. S., 145 Fed. I (C. C. A. 2d, i9o5) (indictment for con-
spiracy with persons unknown); Feder v. U. S., 257 Fed. 694 (C. C. A. 2d,
I919) (indictment of two defendants alone).
CAr- PEN. CODE (1927) § 1026.
2 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct 14 (908) ; Garland v.
Washington, 232 U. S. 642, 34 Sup. Ct. 456 (i913) ; Rogers v. Peck, i99 U. S.
425, 26 Sup. Ct. 87 (zgo5).
'State v. Hodgson, 66 Vt 134, 28 Atl. io89 (1893).
' Hurtado v. California, 11o U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. i1 (1883).
'People v. Sexton, 187 N. Y. 495, 8o N. E. 396 (igo7).
'Vega S. S. Co. v. Consolidated Elevator Co., 75 Minn. 308, 77 N. W. 973
7 Hammond v. State, 78 Ohio St. i5, 84 N. E. 416 (I9O8).
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the present case it was argued that the statute was unreasonable, and therefore
invalid, because in effect the defendant went to trial with the necessary mental
element of the crime conclusively presumed against him, in that he was unable
to furnish evidence concerning the lack of such mental state until after the
jury had tried the first issue and had rendered a verdict of guilty. Such a
jury, it was contended, would thereafter be incapable of finding impartially
whether or not the defendant in fact had the mental state necessary for the
commission of the crime. However, as a legislature can require that insanity
be specially pleaded,' there seems to be no legal objection to its prescribing the
method in which such pleas will be tried, so Jong as the defendant at some stage
of the trial is permitted to offer all the evidence he chooses which will tend to
exonerate him. Thus while it may be admitted that as a practical matter the
statute in question may have the effect of prejudicing the defendant's rights, it
is perhaps fortunate that the due process clause can not be invoked as a means
of invalidating state legislation enacted to remedy an ever growing evil in the
administration of the criminal law.
DIvoRc-LiABILITY OF HUSBAND'S ESTATE FOR ALImONY-A wife ob-
tained a decree of absolute divorce from her husband in the State of Ne-
braska, where she was domiciled and where he appeared and answered. The
decree provided that the hasband should pay her a certain sum per month "in
lieu of her dower, as long as she lives or until she remarries." This is an
action against the estate of the husband. Held, that the Pennsylvania Court
must give full faith and credit to the decree but that it was not intended by the
decree that the estate of the husband should pay alimony accruing after his
death. Watrous's Estate, io Pa. Super. Adv. 309 (1928).
The estate of the husband is usually held to be liable to a divorced wife
for alimony accruing before the death of the husband. The generally adopted
view, however, is that no alimony becomes due after his death In the case
of a judicial separation, the woman, being still the lawful wife of the de-
ceased, is enitled to dower, and of course there is no liability on the estate for
maintenance3 A few courts seem to allow the obligation of the husband to
pay alimony in an absolute divorce to survive the husband and his estate will
become liable under certain conditions.' Under this view a mere provision
that alimony shall be paid "so long as the wife shall live," or "until she re-
8 Bal, v. State, 2og Ala. i42, 95 So. 467 (1923) ; People v. Hickman, 268
Pac. 909 (Cal. 1928).
People v. Connor, 142 N. Y. I3O, 36 N. E. 8o7 (1894) ; Bennett v. State,
57 Wis. 69, 14 N. W. 912 (1883).
'Mcllroy v. Mcllroy, 208 Mass. 4.58, 94 N. E. 696 (1911).
'Parsons v. Parsons' Estate, 70 Colo. 333, 201 Pac. 559 (1921); Wilson
v. Hinman, 182 N. Y. 408, 75 N. E. 236 (1905).
'Wagner v. Wagner, 132 Mich. 343, 93 N. W. 889 (19o3).
" Ex parte Hart, 94 Cal. 254, 29 Pac. 774 (1892) ; Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick,
127 Minn. 96, 148 N. W. lO74 (1914).
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marries," will be enforced against his estate after his death.! This view would
seem to be clearly wrong in that alimony by its very nature is only intended
to be an equivalent of the husband's obligation for support which arises in favor
of the wife out of the marriage relation3 The fact that a woman who has di-
vorced her husband absolutely, receives no dower," is an additional justification
for discontinuing alimony after his death! Therefore the Pennsylvania Court
would seem to be correct in applying the rule favored by the majority of juris-
dictions, since the law in Nebraska as to the interpretation of such a decree was
not dear 9 Owing to the fact that alimony is much restricted in Pennsylvania,"
such a claim as that brought forward in the principal case is unlikely to arise
under Pennsylvania law.
EXTrrIo -INERSTATE-PARoLED CONVICT ENTERING ANOTHER STATE
BECOmES FUGITIVE 7RO1 JusixcE AFTER PAROLE IS REVOKED--Petitioner was
paroled from-the penitentiary in state A with express permission to reside in
state B for one year. Within that time his parole was revoked and requisition
was made by state A for his rendition. Petitioner was arrested on a warrant
issued by the governor of B and applied for a writ of habeas coritp. Held, that
petitioner is a fugitive from justice and subject to rendition to the demanding
state under the Constitution1 and laws' of the United States. Writ denied.
Ex parte Harilton, 273 Pac. 286 (Okla. 1929).
In the determination of this case two questions are presented. First, is the
accused "charged . . . with . ... crime," and second, is he a fugitive
from justice? 8 The term "charged" applies to persons convicted as well as to
persons merely sought for the purpose of trial' The aim of the Constitution
is that the justice of the offended state shall be satisfied,5 and so if a convict
escapes, or violates his parole, the term of his imprisonment ceases to run and
he may, after its nominal expiration, be brought back. to complete his sentence 4
5Ex parte Hart, mspra note 4.
'KEEaER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (2d. ed. 1923) § 660.
'Barrett v. Failing, III U. S. 523 (1884).
'See Seibly v. Person, xo5 Mich. 584, 63 N. W. 528 (i895).
'Walton v. Walton, 57 Neb. 102, 77 N. W. 392 (1898); Tatro v. Tatro,
18 Neb. 395, 25 N. W. 571 (i885).
DANNEHOWER'S STURGEON, PENNSYLVANIA DIVORCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2087
et. seq.
'U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art IV, Sec. 2, cl. 2: "A person charged in any
state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be
found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state
from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdic-
tion of the crime."
-I STAT. 302 (793), 18 U. S. C. §662 (C. 1928)..
'Supra note I. See Note (1918) 18 COL. L. REv. 7o.
'2 MooRE, EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENImoN (891) §530.
5 HAWLEY, INTERSTATE EXTRADTIoN (1890) Io.
'Hollon v. Hopkins, 21 Kan. 638 (1879); Dolan's Case, ioi Mass. 219
(1869); Ex parle Carroll, 86 Tex. Cr. 301, 217 S. W. 382 (919).
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It is generally held that to be a fugitive from justice under the interstate
rendition laws, it is not necessary that the person charged with having left the
state in which the crime was alleged to have been committed, did so for the
purpose of avoiding a prosecution anticipated or begun, but simply that, having
within a state committed a crime against the laws, he leaves such state, and
when sought to be subjected to its criminal process, is found within the terri-
tory of another, state:' Prisoners who have violated their paroles by leaving
the state of their conviction, have accordingly been extradited on requisition to
the asylum state8 The principal case is unique on its facts in that the prisoner
was given express permission to go into another state, and was but exercising
that permission when his rendition was sought. As pointed out by the court,
however, the journey to the other state was voluntary on the part of the peti-
tioner and, in the absence of a recognition of compulsory process from the other
state, it cannot be said that the demanding state waived its right to regain jurisdic-
tion over i.iht The asylum state is not concerned with the reason for the rev-
ocation of tie parole,"' and, therefore, the petitioner was correctly held subject
to rendition...
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMIENTs-LABILITY OF AN UNAUTHORiZED AGENT UNDER
THE N. I. L.-Defendant without authority signed a promissory note in the
name of a corporation, adding his own name as president. Held, under Section
2o of the N. I. L., that the. defendant is liable personally on the instrument. New
Georgia Nat7 Bank v. Lippmai, 249 N. Y. 307, 164 N. E. io8 (1928).
At common law, one who without authority signed the name of another
to a written: instrument, was not himself liable on the instrument, although
there was soie authority to the contrary.' However, in most jurisdictions the
unauthorized hgent was held liable in an action of assumpsit, for breach of
an implied wai-ranty of authority,' and of course, if he had knowledge of the
lack of authority, he could be held liable in a tort action for fraud and deceit.'
7 Roberts r. Reilly, 116 U. S. 8o, 6 Sup. Ct 291 (1885); Appleyard v. Massa-
chusetts, 2o3 U. S. 222, 27 Sup. Ct. 122 (19o6); In re Voorhees, 32 N. 3. L. 141
(1867).
' vHughes . Pflanz, 138 Fed. 98o (9o5); Drinkall v. Spiegel, 68 Conn.
441, 36 Atl. 83o .(i896).
'In re Whittington, 34 Cal. App. 344, 167 Pac. 404 (1917); see Hess v.
Grimes, ; Kan. App. 763, 48 Pac. 596 (1897). But cf. Er parte Youstler, 268
Pac. 32 (Okla. 1928).
"Ex parte Williams, Io Okla. Cr. 344, 136 Pac. 597 (1913). Contra: Ex
parte Wernhause, 2D2 Mo. App. -45, 216 S. W. 548 (1919).
1People's National'.Bank v. Dixwell, 217 Mass. 436, 1O5 N. E. 435 0914)
Cole v. O'Brieh, 34 Neb. 68, 51 N. W. 316 (1892); American Surety Co. v.
Morton, 32 Okla. 687, '122 Pac. 1io3 (1912).
'Dusenbury v. Ellis', 3 Johns 70 (N. Y. 1802).
' Collen v. Wright, 8 E. & B. 647 (Eng. 1857) ; Golden v. Ellwood, 299 Ill.
73, 132 N. E. 223 (1921); Haupt v. Vint, 68 W. Va. 657, 70 S. E. 702 (1911).
' Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & Ad. 114 (Eng. 1832); McCurdy v. Rogers, 21
Wis. 197 (1866).
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Section 2o of the N. I. L. provides, "Where the instrument contains, or a person
adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a
principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument
if he was duly authorized; but the mere addition of words describing him as an
agent, or as filling a representative character, without disclosing his principal,
does not exempt him from personal liability." There is a conflict both in the
*decisions' and of theoretical opinion' as to whether this section changes the
common law rule as to the nature of an unauthorized agent's liability. But
bearing in mind the general principle of statutory construction, that rules of
the common law can be changed only by clear and unambiguous language, and
not by inference,1 it seems as a matter of principle that section 20 of the N. L L.
should not be construed as changing the common law rule in the case where the
agent is unauthorized. Judge Cardozo, in writing the opinion in the principal
case recognized the force of this argument, but based the decision cn policy,
because under this section the agent is relieved of common law liability in the
case where he is authorized, and it accomplishes a just result to hold him liable
on the instrument when he is not authorized. Moreover holding the agent liable
on the instrument eliminates the difficult problem of the measure of damages
involved when the agent is being sued for breach of his implied warranty of
authority.
SET-OFF-RIGELT op BANK TO SET OFF UNMATURED NoTEs AGAINST DE-
PosIT oF INsoLvENT-The plaintiff's intestate, who died insolvent, had a personal
checking account with the defendant bank. The defendant held unmatured notes
of the decedent, and claimed the right to set off the amount of the notes against
the plaintiff's claim. Held, that the defendant was entitled to this set-off.
Sidlivan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, I44 Atl. 34 (Conn. 1928).
While the right of set-off, in a court of law, is purely statutory," it existed
in equity long prior to the set-off statutes, and so it is granted there upon funda-
mental equitable principles.' Consequently, it is allowed in certain cases where
legal set-off would be unavailable. When a creditor's debt to an insolvent is
payable in futuro, and the insolvent's debt to the creditor is payable in praesenti,
the authorities are in almost complete harmony in allowing a set-off. The
'That the unauthorized agent is liable: Pain v. Holtcamp, io F. (2d) 443
(1926) ; Ryan v. Hebert, 46 R. I. 47, 124 AtI. 657 (924). Conr=: Southern
Supply Co. v. Mathias, 147 Md. 256, x28 At. 66 (1925); Haupt v. Vint, supra
note 3.
'See BRANNON, NEwoTIABLE INSTRUIENTS LAW, (4th ed. 1926) 163.
I Ryalls v. Mechanics' Mills, iSo Mass. 19o, 22 N. E. 766 (i88) ; Woollcott
v. Shubert, 217 N. Y. 212, iii N. E. 89 (1916)i State v. Central Vermont
M. R., 81 Vt 459, 71 Ati. 193 (19o8).
1 See United States v. Eckford, 6 Wall. 484, 488 (U. S. 1867).
2 Collins v. Campbell, 97 Me. 23, 53 At. 837 (i9o2) ; Blake v. Langdon, i9
Vt. 485 (1847).
' Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 13 Sup. Ct. 148 (1892) ; Bradley v.
Angel, 3 N. Y. 475 (185o).
928 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
theory of these decisions is that the creditor may waive the time of payment
of his debt, both debts thus becoming present debts.
4  But where the creditor's
debt is payable i praesenti, and the insolvenes debt is payable in futuro, the
cases are at variance. The federal courts and a majority of the state courts
allow a set-off in such a case, on the theory that insolvency renders all debts
due, and furnishes equitable grounds for setting off ,the debts.' A very sub-
stantial minority of the jurisdictions, however, including Pennsylvania, refuses
to permit a set-off in this situation. These courts reason that the creditor
has no claim at the time of insolvency, and to allow him to offset a claim
arising after that time would be prejudicial to the rights of the general creditors,
which have accrued in the meantime. While much may be said in favor of
both theories, it seems inequitable, when both obligations are absolute, to com-
pel the creditor to pay his debt in full and receive only a pro rata share of
the assets of the insolvent, in satisfaction of his claim. The fallacy of the
minority rule lies in the failure to recognize that, in the eyes of equity, the
creditor has a measurable claim, from the moment of insolvency.
ToRTs-RzcovERY FOR MENTAL SUFFERING IN CONNEcrION wITH TREsPAss
To REALTY-Defendant, by means of attachment proceedings resorted to during
lessee's temporary absence for that express purpose, evicted lessee, wilfully and
maliciously from apartment occupied by her under tenancy. In action for this
wrongful eviction the plaintiff stated the situation "caused me great mental dis-
tress and upset me terribly." -Held, (one judge dissenting) that mental suffering,
established as the proximate and natural consequence of the trespass to realty,
is entitled to compensation. Hargrave v. Leigh, 273 Pac. 298 (Utah 1928).
That mere fright or mental suffering, without any physical injury resulting
therefrom, can not be the basis of a cause of action is said to be well settled.'
It has been generally thought that to deal with fright alone is to deal with
a metaphysical condition in contradistinction to a physical condition; with some-
thing subjective, instead of objective, and entirely within the realm of specu-
lation? A growing number of courts have allowed recovery when there is injury
'Lindsay v. Jackson, 2 Paige 58I (N. Y. 1831).
'Schuler v. Israel, 120 U. S. 506, 7 Sup. Ct. 648 (1887); Pendleton v.
Hellman Com. Trust & Say. Bank, 58 Cal. App. 448, 2o8 Pac. 702 (1922) ; Nash-
ville Trust Co. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 91 Tenn. 336, 18 S. W. 822 (1892).
Fei a v. Wickham, 135 N. Y. 223, 31 N. E. 1O28 (1892); Blum Bros. v.
Girard N-.t. Bank, 248 Pa. 148, 93 AtI. 94o (1915) ; Kurz v. County Nat. Bank,
288 Pa. 472, 136 Atl. 789 (1927) ; (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. IO.
' Fera v. Wickham; Kurz v. County Nat. Bank, both supra note 6.
' See Clark, Set-Off in Cases of Immature Claims in Insolvency and Re-
ceivership (1920) 34 HARv. L. Rxv. 178, containing a very interesting discussion
of this problem, and advancing the theory that insolvency is an anticipatory
breach of the contract, giving the creditor an immediate claim.
1Bohlen, Right to Recover for In-jury Resulting from Negligenee Without
Impact (19o2) 41 AmERa. L. REG. 141.
"Alabama Fuel and Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 3o6, 320, 73 So. 205
(I916).
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even though it arose from a mental condition, since in such cases the damages
are quite as capable of being measured by a jury as if they had resulted from
an impact or blow While the courts are convinced that the damages suffered
when the only manifestation is fright are not capable of admeasurement by any
standard known to the law they have not followed the theory in a number of
instances. The action of assault recognizes a recovery for fright;' and where
the fright is serious, substantial damages are recoverable. In the action of
seduction the chief element of damage is mental suffering, even though the courts
generally base their decisions on a. technical loss of service. In breach of
promise suits mortification and distress of mind are often the only elements
for recovery7 In the principal case the court allowed a recovery for fright
because it was accompanied by a wilful invasion, of the plaintiff's home.' The
purpose, it would appear, was to allow recovery and as long as a trespass to
realty was involved there might be recovery for any damage that flowed in an
unbroken chain of causation from the defendanes act. The case is illustrative
of the desire of courts to allow recovery for mental suffering, but to so restrict
the cases as to prevent fraudulent claims. It has been suggested ' that in the
light of the many exceptions the courts ought to throw aside fictions and regard
mental suffering, standing alone,, as an injury on which an action for damages
may be based. It would seem that what is needed is a. recognition by the courts
that the problem is not exclusively one in the realm of damages, nor of pre-
vention of fraudulent claims, but rather in finding a legally protected right and
hence a duty not to violate the right. When. the courts determine to protect
such a right, they would seem logically, to have to extend the protection to
every violation. Should they distinguish between intentional and unintentional
violations they would be making the existence of- a. protected right depend upon
the character of the defendant's actions.
' Purcl v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 5o N. W. IO34 (i892). For
collection of cases between igoi-I2o- see Throckmorton, Damages. for Fright
(i92i) 34 HARv. L. Rsv. 26o.
'Handy v. Johnson, 5 Md. 45o (1854) ; Hurst v. Carlisle, 3 P. & W. (Pa.
1830.
rSmall v. Lovergan, 81 Kans. 48, io5 Pac. 27 (igog).
'Kendrick v. McCrary, ii Ga. 603 (1852). Hord v. Sudderth, iii N. C.
215, 16 S. E. 397 (1892) (does away with theory of loss of service and allows
a woman to sue for her own seduction).
See amusing analysis of situation Brown, Breach of Promise Suits (1929)
77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 474, 492.
'Accord: Moyes v. Gordon, 113 Md. 282, 14 N. E. 476 (1887); Fillebrown
v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580 (1878) - contra.: Ford v. Schlessinwu, 107 Wis. 479 83
N. W. 761; cf. Murray v. Mace, 4t Neb.'6o; 59 N. W. 387 (1894) (allowing
recovery for mental suffering where the unlawful acts are inspired by fraud or
malice)., The dissent in the principal case explains away the accord cases as
being cases where the plaintiff is apprehensive of personal violence or where
trespass is. calculated to cause shame or humiliation, which elemenr., were not
present in the case.
'Levin, Damages for Fright and Proximate Cause (i919) 17 MICH. L
REV. 407.
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WIIJ S--WORDS PASSING A FEE SIMPLE UNDER PEINSYLVANIA LAW-
Testator's will read: "I . . do give to my sister . . . the following
properties (naming them) : to collect the rents from them as long as she shall
live." The heirs-at-law of the testator bring ejectment against the devisees of
the sister's will, on the theory that under testator's will the sister took only
a life estate, and that on her death title reverted to testator's heirs-at-law.
Held, that under the testator's will the sister took a fee simple title, and title is
in the devisees of her will. Graham v. Gamber, io Pa. Super. Adv. 5o2 (1929).
At common law, a devise of land without words of inheritance gave the
devisee a mere life estate,1 and this was the early rule in Pennsylvania.2 This
requirement of words of inheritance has been largely abolished by statutes, and
the courts have generally held that under such statutes any words of gift pass
a fee, unless a contrary intent is expressed Under such statutes, the first ques-
tion to be decided is, did the words pass a fee. The Pennsylvania decisions seem
to hold that if there be any doubt at all, a fee will pass' and this seems to
be the rule in other jurisdictions. 5 When this question is determined the next
problem is, do later words in the will cut the fee down to a lesser estate, or, as
it has been expressed, qualify and explain the estate given.' The Pennsylvania
rule is that *it takes the clearest expression of intent to cut down or modify a
fee already given.7 This tendency to favor a fee, coupled with the rules of con-
struction that the court will not presume that a testator intended to die
intestate, which often results where the fee is cut down, and the "four
corner" rule, render it extremely difficult to create an esfate less than a fee
in Pennsylvania, unless such words as "to A for life" are used.' In Ki's
Estate, the devise read "to . . . wife . . . all my . . . estate . . .
12 BL Com. io8.
2 Steele v. Thompson, 14 S. & R. 84 (Pa. 1826).
'2 PAGE, WILLS (2d. 1926) §959. In Pennsylvania the Act of 1833, P. L.
249 § 9, reenacted by the Wills Act, Act of 1917, P. L. 403 § x2, PA. STAT.
(West i92o) § 832o abolishes the necessity of words of inheritance, to pass
a fee by will. See, Schuldt v. Herbine, 3 Pa. Super. 65 (1896).
' See such typical cases as: Snyder v. Baer, 144 Pa. 278, 22 Atl. 897 (1891);
Geyer v. Wentzel, 68 Pa. 84 (1871). In Moyer v. Rentschler, 231 Pa. 62o, 81
Atl. 52 (1911) and in Hoxie v. Chamberlain, 228 Pa. 31, 76 AtI. 423 (191o) the
court refused to sustain what seemed to be valid executory devises over, even
assuming that the original gift passed a fee. It seems to take the strongest sort
of language to create an estate less than a fee, as in Mcflevitt's Appeal, 113 Pa.
103 (1885).
'Gra,.t v. Mullen, 138 AtI. 613 (Del. 1926), see note (1928) 26 MicH. L.
REV. 822; In re Brown, 119 Kans. 4o2, 239 Pac. 747 (1925), see note (1926)
24 Micr. L. REv. 518; cf. Krause v. Krause, 113 Neb. 23, 21o N. W. 67o (1924),
note (1925) 3 Wis. L. REV. 313.
'Shower's Estate, 211 Pa. 297, 6o At. 789 (I9o5).
7 Cross v. Miller, 290 Pa. 213, 138 Atl. 822 (i927), commented on in (1928)
41 HARv. L. REv. 544; cf. Reiff v. Peppo. 29o Pa. 5o8, 139 Atl. i44, see note
(I927) 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 459. See Metzen v. Schopp, 22 I1. 275, 67 N. E.
36 (I9o3).
'See Reynolds v. 'Crispin, 8 Sad. 252, II Atl. 236 (Pa' 1887) which lays
down the rules of construction in these cases.
'293 Pa. 21, 141 Atl. 644 (1928).
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to hold and enjoy as she thinks best as long as she remains my widow, and to
dispose of at her death among the children as she thinks best . . ." The
court held that the widow took a fee, subject to defeasance if she remarry."
In view of the holding in Kidd's Estate, it would appear that the superior court
was correct in the principal case, which does not present as difficult a problem
as was before the court in Kidd's Estate.
'Thereby overruling, sub silentio, Cooper v. Pogue, 92 Pa. 254 (1879).
l The cases cited are but a fraction of all the Pennsylvania cases. All the
cases are cited in CROWTHME, DES Booic oF PA. DEcisioNs (1924) TIT. WILLS
§§ 486, 490, and is brought up to date by supplements.
